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Abstract: It  should  come  as  no  surprise  that  prisons  can  become  breeding  grounds  for
radicalisation and terrorism [1].  In many cases, extremist  ideologies can flourish in prisons
through recruiting vulnerable inmates to follow their path. Despite being a popular topic among
researchers and policymakers, there still remain significant gaps in our understanding and many
unanswered questions. This paper provides an overview on prisoner radicalisation, specifically
exploring the role religion plays in prison and its link to radicalisation, prisoner vulnerability to
radicalisation  and  the  radicalisation  process.  The  paper  also  outlines  the  current  debate
regarding where is the best place to house terrorist prisoners (isolation vs. separation). The
paper concludes by identifying the major gaps in the literature and offers concluding remarks.
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1. Introduction
Prisoner  radicalisation  is  not  a  recent  phenomenon
and  yet  it  is  an  area  that  is  misunderstood  and
theoretically  underdeveloped.   Throughout  history
prisons  have  served  as  recruitment  centres  and
headquarters  for  ideological  extremists  (such  as
Joseph Stalin and Adolf Hitler), where they used their
time  behind  bars  to  develop  extremist  philosophies
and  recruit  others  into  their  mode  of  thinking  [2].
Some of the most powerful criminal groups, such as
the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) in São Paulo,
Brazil, and the Commando Vemelho (Red Command)
in  Rio  De  Janeiro,  Brazil,  originated  in  prisons  [3].
Even  so,  since  11  September  2001  (9/11)  several
individuals  have  been  radicalised  while  being
incarcerated [4].   For example, prisoner Richard Reid
converted  to  Islam  while  incarcerated  and  when
released  attempted  to  smuggle  explosives  on  an
American  airline  flight  in  December  2001  [5].
Research suggests that many prisoners enter prison
with little or no religious calling, but over the duration
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of their incarceration some adopt a faith (e.g. Islam)
[6]. However, of those who convert to Islam only a
very small percentage will turn into radical extremists
and an even smaller percentage will go on to join a
terrorist  organisation  [7].  An  interesting  study
conducted by the United States Senate, Committee on
the  Judiciary,  claim  that  roughly  80%  percent  of
prisoners within America turn to Islam when seeking
for faith behind bars [6].  This percentage translates
into  a  prisoner  conversion  rate  of  approximately
30,000 yearly [7]. 
Prisons by their very nature are hostile environments
(e.g.  their  isolation,  cultural  dissatisfaction,  and
predisposition for violent tendencies) and as such are
susceptible to radicalisation extremists [8]. The 2009
World Prison Population List estimates that more than
9.8 million people are held in penal institutions around
the  world  and  almost  a  third  of  these  are  in  the
United  States  (USA,  2.29  million  [9]).  Even  more
interesting, is that around 300 federal prisoners in the
US are serving sentences on terrorism-related charges
[8]. Terrorists jailed for criminal activities can thrive in
prison.  Recruiters  are  able  to  spot,  assess,  and
encourage potential recruits to follow their path, drawing
from  a  constantly  regenerating  pool  of  candidates
[10,11].  Terrorist  recruitment  therefore  "operates  in
the deep underground of inmate subculture, between
the seams of prison gangs and extremist religions that
inspire ideologies of intolerance, hatred, and violence"
([7], p. 111). This type of environment allows terrorist
recruitment  to  flourish  and  can  remain  virtually
undetected.  However,  with  the  many  advances  in
technology, education and increased prison personnel,
these  advances  are  making  it  extremely  hard  for
terrorist recruitment to remain undetected. 
Prisoner  radicalisation  is  a  popular  topic  of
discussion; however, despite this recognition it has not
been fully explored and is a phenomenon that is not
well understood [1,12]. Furthermore, the process of
radicalisation  in  prisons  in  particular  is  poorly
understood  because  of  the  very  limited  information
researchers  can  obtain  and  this  consequently
obstructs  the  development  or  improvement  of
effective intervention methods [4].  Radicalisation, by
most  accounts,  can  create  the  motivational  or
cognitive preconditions for terrorism and therefore it
is important that we understand the prerequisite for
effectively combating terrorism [13]. 
An  even  more  interesting  and  well-rehearsed
argument among researchers and practitioners is that
there  has  been  an  inadequate  effort  to  define
radicalisation  [14].  According  to  the  Oxford  English
Dictionary  (OED) to  radicalise  is  to:  1)  cause
(someone) to become an advocate of radical political
or social reforms and 2) introduce fundamental or far-
reaching  change  [15].  Only  recently  has  the  OED
defined radicalisation. Radicalisation according to the
OED means:  "The action  or  process  of  making or
becoming radical, esp. in political outlook" [15]. This
definition  however,  is  extremely  vague.  Currently,
many organisations and scholars have come up with
their  own  definition;  however,  despite  having  some
similarities among these definitions there still lacks a
generic  definition  that  can  be  used  across  all
disciplines  and  organisations.  For  example,  the
Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  Denmark  defines
radicalisation  as  "the  phenomenon  of  people
embracing opinions views and ideas that could lead to
acts of terrorism" ([16], p. 8). This definition is very
subjective in that the radicalisation label applied to an
individual  requires making an assessment about the
possible  harm  that  an  individual  poses  to  another
party [13]. This definition is also very general, stating
that embracing any views/opinions can ultimately lead
to acts of terrorism. 
In contrast, the Office of the Inspector General of
the  US  Department  of  Justice  [17]  claims
radicalisation is "the process by which inmates who do
not invite or plan overt terrorist acts adopt extreme
views, including beliefs that violent measures need to
be  taken  for  political  or  religious  purposes" (p.  6).
Similarly, a review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons'
Selection  of  Muslim  Religious  Services  Providers  by
the  Department  of  Justice  [17]  states  that
radicalisation "refers to the process by which inmates
…adopt  extreme views  including  beliefs  that  violent
measures need to be taken for political  or religious
purposes" (p. 6). This places more emphasis on the
cognitive (that views and beliefs justify violence) and
behavioural aspects (invitation to join a group) [13].
These definitions acknowledge that radicalisation is a
process and, unlike the definition by the Ministry of
Foreign  Affairs  of  Denmark,  they  state  that
radicalisation is when an individual adopts  'extremist'
views,  rather  than simply  adopting  any opinions  or
views. More recently, Fraihi [18] provides a succinct
definition  which  brings  us  closer  to  defining
radicalisation. In a recent essay Fraihi [18] states: 
Radicalization is a process in which an individual's
convictions  and  willingness  to  seek  for  deep  and
serious changes in the society increase. Radicalism
and  radicalization  are  not  necessarily  negative.
Moreover, different forms of radicalization exist. This
concentration on the individual is indicative of the
focus of expert and government concern (p. 135). 
An  important  distinction  from  the  previous
definitions is that Fraihi [18] acknowledges that not all
radicalisation is negative and that radicalisation is not
always a precursor to terrorism. It also suggests that
radicalisation is an individual experience, whereby the
individual has to be 'willing' to undergo some deep or
serious change. Moreover, it is a psychological process
where  individuals  move  towards  more  extremist
views [19].
As with radicalisation, terrorism also seems to be a
hard concept  to define.  Bilgi  [20] outlines  that  this
stems  from  two  main  reasons:  first,  the  term
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terrorism is often interpreted as a pejorative concept,
meaning that those who are defined as terrorists are
said to 'deserve the blame', and secondly, terrorism is
used  in  highly  emotive  settings,  meaning  that
terrorism is often associated with violence, death, and
war. Although these reasons make it seem impossible
to define, it is not an impossible task to do so. For
example,  the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation  (FBI)
defines terrorism as  "the unlawful  use of  force and
violence against persons or property to intimidate or
coerce a government, the civilian population, or any
segment thereof,  in furtherance of political or social
objection" ([20], p. 12). While the European Union's
Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism defines
it as: 
An intentional act which may seriously damage a
country or an international organisation, committed
with the aim of seriously intimidating a population,
unduly compelling a Government or an international
organisation to perform or abstain from performing
any  act,  seriously  destabilizing  or  destroying
fundamental  political,  constitutional,  economic  or
social  structures  by  means  of  attacks  upon  a
person’s life, attacks upon the physical integrity of
a  person,  kidnapping,  hostage-taking,  seizure  of
aircraft or ships, or the manufacture, possession or
transport  of  weapons  or  explosives  (cited  in  the
European Report [21], p. 6). 
This is a legal definition of terrorism and, as such,
only partially overlaps with those used by academics.
There are hundreds of definitions of terrorism, often
emphasising a variety or feature of terrorism such as: 
…its  often  symbolic  in  nature,  its  often
indiscriminate  nature,  its  typical  focus  on civilian
and  non-combatant  targets  its  sometimes
provocative and retributive aims, the disruption of
public order and endangering of public security, the
creation  of  a  climate  of  fear  to  influence  an
audience wider than the direct victims as well as its
disregard  of  the  rules  of  war  and  the  rules  of
punishment ([22], p. 6).
Many scholars have also come up with their own
definition  of  terrorism.  For  example,  Jenkins  [23]
defines  terrorism as  "the  use or  threatened  use  of
force  to  bring  about  change" (p.  3).  Similarly,
Sederberg defines terrorism as  "the threat or use of
violence  for  political  purposes  when  such  action  is
intended to influence the attitudes and behaviour of a
target group wider than its immediate victim" (cited in
[24], p. 4). What is common among these definitions
is that terrorism includes the unlawful use of violence
with the aim of pursuing political or social objectives
that target enemies [20]. Also, many scholars agree
that  the  root  cause  or  procurer  of  terrorism is  not
radicalisation—simply because not all radicals become
terrorists [25]. 
Today,  many  governments,  especially  Western
governments  (after  the  9/11  attack)  are  concerned
about  the  threat  of  terrorism  and  are  primarily
focused  on  what  is  called  'Radical  Islam', a  term
defined  as  "the  politico-religious  pursuit  of
establishing—if  necessary  by  extreme  means—a
society which reflects the perceived values from the
original sources of Islam as purely as possible" ([26],
p.  3). However,  it  is important to note that  'Radical
Islam' does not always mean violence and cannot be
a sufficient cause of terrorism because most radicals
are not terrorists [13,25].
Overall,  it  is  a  well  known  argument  among
scholars that there is no 'one-size-fits-all' definition of
radicalisation  or  terrorism  that  will  satisfy  all
disciplines and practitioners. The terms radicalisation
and  terrorism  are  not  precise  concepts  but  rather
pejorative labels, and therefore it is not surprising that
there has been an inadequate effort to define them.
This  paper  begins  by  outlining  the  penal  system
and the role of religion. Next, it outlines the different
types  of  recruitment  methods  employed  by  Islamic
extremist  groups  and  discusses  the  process  of
radicalisation.  Finally,  it  concludes  by  examining  an
ongoing  debate  as  to  whether  terrorists  should  be
isolated,  concentrated,  or  separated  from  ordinary
criminals.
2. Prision and Religion
Some  prisons  are  notorious  for  being  harsh
environments and for many inmates religion is one of
the  methods  used  to  cope  with  the  prison
environment  [27].  There  is  a  belief,  especially  in
prisons in the US, that religion plays a profound and
necessary role in the creation and maintenance of a
moral and law abiding community [28]. For example,
religion  is  widely  practised  among  the  two  million
prisoners in the US [28]. In the United Kingdom (UK),
the Muslim population has risen from 4,298 in 2000 to
10,672 in 2011 [29]. In the US approximately 350,000
inmates are Muslim (2003) and 80% of prisoners who
convert  while  in  prison convert  to  Islam [8].  Islam
conversion in prisons is not a new phenomenon and
has  been  present  in  American  prisons  since  their
inception in the early nineteenth century ([30], p. 90).
As Lofland and Skonovd [31] state: 
The  intellectual  mode  of  conversion  commences
with an individual, private investigation of possible
new  grounds  of  being,  alternate  theodicies,
personal  fulfilment,  etc.,  by  reading  books,
watching television,  attending lectures, and other
impersonal  or  disembodied  ways  in  which  it  is
increasingly  possible  sans  social  involvement  to
become acquainted  with  alternate  ideologies  and
ways of life. In the course of such reconnaissance,
some  individuals  convert  themselves  in  isolation
from  any  interaction  with  devotees  of  the
respective religion (p. 376).
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The literature on Islam in prisons is  divided into
two  schools  of  thought.  One  side  indicates  that
Muslim  groups  in  prison  are  breeding  grounds  for
terrorists and the other side indicates that there is no
relationship between prisoner conversion to Islam and
terrorism  [7].  Nevertheless,  research  shows  that
religion plays an important role in prison security and
rehabilitation [7]. Clear and Sumter [27] administered
self-report  questionnaires  to  769 prisoners  from 12
state  prisons  and  found  that  increasing  levels  of
religiosity are associated with high levels of in-prison
adjustment  and  are  also  significantly  related  to  a
smaller  number  of  times  inmates  are  placed  in
disciplinary  confinement  for  violating  prison  rules.
O’Connor  and  Perreyclear  [28]  also  found  that  as
religion  intensified  prison  disciplinary  infractions
declined.
Similarly, Roy [32] argues that it makes more sense
to separate theology from violence: 
'The process of violent radicalisation has little to do
with  religious  practice,  while  radical  theology,  as
salafisme,  does  not  necessarily  lead to  violence'.
The 'leap into terrorism' is not religiously inspired,
but better seen as sharing 'many factors with other
forms of dissent, either political (the ultra-left), or
behavioural:  the  fascination  for  sudden  suicidal
violence as illustrated by the paradigm of random
shootings in schools (the  "Columbine syndrome")'
(Roy, cited in [19], p. 21). 
However, there are also cases where religion has
been  used  to  breed  terrorists.  For  example,  Kevin
Lamar  James  recruited  more  than  a  dozen  fellow
prisoners  into  a  terrorist  group  called  Jam'iyyat  Ui-
Islam  Is-Saheeh  (JIS)  [7].  According  to  Ian
Cuthbertson,  James  convinced  these  men  that  his
interpretation of  the Koran (called the JIS Protocol)
was the true version [10]. Members of JIS were also
recruited  outside  prison  walls.  Prospective  JIS
members outside prison were instructed to blend into
society by marrying, getting a job, dressing casually
and needed to acquire two pistols with silencers and
learn how to make bombs [33]. These men were later
instructed to attack government agencies and military
stations throughout the US [10,33]. 
Another  case  is  Jamal  'el  Chino' Ahmidan  who
embraced jihadist principles while serving time and is
the  mastermind  behind  the  2004  Madrid  train
bombings.  Richard  Reid,  known  as  the  'shoe
bomber',  who  attempted  to  blow  up  an  American
Airline flight between Paris and Miami in 2001, also
converted to Islam while serving time for a string of
muggings [7,34]. 
3. Vulnerability
When a person becomes imprisoned it is common for
the individual to go through physical  and emotional
trauma  that  can  make  them  more  vulnerable  to
recruitment.  For example, in the beginning when an
individual  is  placed in  jail,  acute and chronic  stress
factors can give rise to physical problems (e.g. sleep
disorders, loss of appetite, etc.) which can make the
prisoner more impressionable and vulnerable. At this
moment  recruiters  can  enter  into  contact  with  the
new  prisoner  and  evaluate  their  vulnerability  and
likeliness to conform to their extremist group [35]. It
is  also  common  for  incarcerated  individuals  to
undergo unbalanced emotional states, such as states
of  discontentment-excitement  (hate,  anger,  doubt)
and  states  of  discontent-relation  (humiliation,  fear,
sadness)  [35].  This  unbalanced  emotional  state  is
ideal for possible recruiters to infiltrate the minds of
the impressionable. 
There  are  also  instances  where  an  incarcerated
individual  can  lose  their  grip  on  their  individual
identity. This is most prominent in foreigners who are
incarcerated in another country and do not speak the
language [35]. For instance, in the UK, the proportion
of  foreign  national  prisoners  has  increased  steadily
over  the  past  decade.  In  the  1990s  the  foreign
population  accounted  for  around  8%  of  the  total
population and this increased to 13% by 2012  [29].
Many of these foreign prisoners have little knowledge
of the country, let alone the culture of the country,
and  to top  it  off  many do not  speak the language
(having  lived,  worked  and/or  socialised  in  their
immigrant  communities)  [10],  thus  making  the
individual  more  susceptible  and  vulnerable  to
extremist groups. 
One theory that can help us understand prisoner
vulnerability  is  the  Transformative  Learning  Theory
(TLT) developed in the 1990s by Jack Mezirow. This is
a framework for understanding how change (learning)
occurs  in  individuals—more  specifically,  how  adults
learn and adapt to new environments [36,37]. In this
instance we are using it to understand the behavioural
changes prisoners undergo while in prison and how
this  learning  transformation  makes  them  more
vulnerable to radical extremists. 
When an individual goes through some sort of crisis
(known as the transformative trigger), the individual
uses pre-existing habits to make sense of the event
[36].  However,  when  the  individual  cannot  make
sense  of  the  situation  and  resorting  back  to  their
habitual  ways fails  to help  them manage the event
this becomes known as a 'distortion'. As a result, the
individual  reacts  to  the  meaning  distortion  by
exploring  new  experiences  and  undergoing  critical
reflection (e.g. turning to religion for guidance) [36].
These new perspectives help the individual cope with
the  new  environment  by  helping  create  new
behaviours, roles, and relationships [36,38]. Overall,
this transformation allows individuals to manage their
new environment, adapt to a new daily routine and
ultimately help an individual learn how to get past a
crisis [36]. However, going through a crisis can make
the individual easier to persuade and even more open
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to manipulation and brainwashing [35], thus making
them very susceptible to extremist recruitment. 
TLT  can  help  shed  light  on  the  process  and
precursors  of  prison  radicalisation.  Individual
radicalisation  is  not  only  associated  with  particular
socio-political  contexts  (e.g.  prison)  and  personal
characteristics, but is also a combination of reflection,
knowledge  acquisition  and  identity  reassessment
[37,39]. As individuals begin to develop self-doubt or
experience confusion over identity or intense personal
debate,  eventually  a  point  is  reached  whereby  the
individual  comes  to  the  realisation  that  their  old
identity  no  longer  exists  and  a  new  one  must  be
established  [37].  Therefore,  when  radicalised
individuals socialise and are validated by other  'like-
minded' individuals, their transformation is reinforced
and the new identity is strengthened [37]. Ultimately,
those  individuals  who  become  violent,  radicalised
inmates not only justify their actions but such actions
are  also  expected  among  the  greater  group  of
radicals. 
Hamm  [7]  interviewed  intelligence  officials  in
Florida and California  in  December 2007 and found
that Florida prisoners were vulnerable to radicalisation
and  terrorist  recruitment.  One  official  stated:
"radicalized  prisoners  are  very  aware  that  people
(authorities) are  interested  in  radicalized  prisoners.
They are very careful who they talk to in prison." The
official also noted that most inmates are radicalised by
other radical inmates and not by outside influence [7].
Overall,  the  majority  of  studies  have  focused on
demographic variables to look at the vulnerability of
individuals, mainly because they are much easier to
access  than  other  variables  [40].  However,  many
empirical studies show that  psychographic variables,
such  as  attitudes,  emotions,  preconceptions,  and
motivations,  seem  to  matter  most  regarding  the
success rate [41].
4. Models of Recruitment
Recruitment  plays  a  significant  role  in  any  terrorist
organisation.  Individuals  can  use  their  expertise  to
spot,  assess,  and  encourage  potential  recruits  to
follow the same path [11].  There are four different
models  of  recruitment:  the  net,  the  funnel,  the
infection and the seed crystal [40]. 
The net pattern occurs when the target population
is  equally  engaged;  for  example,  all  members  are
given  the  same  book  to  read  or  are  invited  to  a
meeting (see Figure 1a). In this instance, the target
audience is  viewed as homogeneous and the group
can be approached with a single undifferentiated pitch
[40]. The funnel pattern occurs when a recruiter takes
an  incremental  approach  (characterised  by
milestones)  when  he  or  she  believes  the  target  or
focal segment population is a prime target (see Figure
1b). This process requires an individual to have the
right  motivation  and  undergo  a  significant
transformation  in  identity.  Therefore  an  individual
starts at one end of the process and is transformed
into a dedicated group member at the other end [40].
The infection pattern occurs when a trusted agent is
inserted into the target  population to rally potential
recruits through direct personal  appeals  (see Figure
1c).  Infection  is  likely  to be successful  where most
members are not extremists; this allows the infiltrator
to  be  able  to  convert  selected  members  who  are
dissatisfied  [40].  Finally,  the  seed crystal  pattern
occurs when the target is very difficult to access and
is very remote: 
This  may  be  compared  to  lowering  the
temperature of a glass until the water inside it
cools and then ice crystals form as the seeds of
a complete freeze ([40], p. 79; see Figure 1d). 
In  terms  of  al-Qaida,  this  approach  may  be  the
most  successful  in  populations  where  open
recruitment is difficult, such as prisons. 
The  four  different  models  of  recruitment  as
proposed by Gerwehr and Daley, 2006 ([40], pp. 73–
89) are shown in Figure 1.
5. Social Movement Theory and Recruitment
One  of  the  most  promising  theoretical  frameworks
applied  to  understanding  radicalisation  is  Social
Movement  Theory  (SMT).  Although  SMT  has  been
used in social  science for the past few decades,  its
application  to  understanding  radicalisation  is  in  its
infancy. Della Porta [42] was one of the first terrorism
researchers to use the SMT concepts in her study of
violent  and  extremist  Italian  and  German  militants.
Della  Porta  [42]  found  that  militant  radicals  were
bound together by personal ties and by their shared
activist experiences and participating radicals acted as
a self-reinforcing mechanism to drive radical activists
to become increasingly more radical. 
Zald and McCarthy [43] define social movement as:
"A set of opinions and beliefs in a population, which
represents preferences for changing some elements of
the  social  structure  and/or  reward  distribution  of  a
society" (p.  2).  The idea behind this  theory is  that
"movements  arose  from  irrational  processes  of
collective  behaviour  occurring  under  strained
environmental conditions (what sociologists would call
Strain  Theory),  producing  a  mass  sentiment  of
discontent.  Individuals  would  'join' a  movement
because  they  passively  succumbed  to  these
overwhelming social  forces" ([44], p. 17). According
to SMT, members recruit others on a rational basis in
order  to  be effective  and efficient.  These  recruiters
seek to identify individuals who are likely to agree to
participate  and  who  are  seen  to  be  potential
individuals who can further their cause [44,45]. 
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Figure 1. The four different models of recruitment as proposed by Gerwehr and Daley ([40], pp. 73–89): 
a) The Net; b) The Funnel; c) The Infection; d) The Seed Crystal.
Brady et al. [45] explain the process of recruitment
as  one  of  'rational  prospecting',  meaning  that
recruiters follow a strategy for seeking out individual
prospects that demonstrate the greatest 'participation
potential',  and  have  conceptualised  the  process  as
having  two  stages:  1)  using  information  to  find
prospects; and 2) getting to 'yes' which is outlined in
Figure 2. 
In the first stage, the recruiter seeks information
regarding the target individual (such as past activities
the individual has been involved in). Also, the recruiter
assesses  whether  or  not  the  individual  has
characteristics (such as political interests or concerns
about political politics) that might predispose them to
take part in their extremist activities [45-47]. Overall,
a  recruiter  wants  as  much  information  as  possible
regarding the potential recruit, especially involving the
individual’s  political  engagement [45].  However,  this
information  is  not  easily  accessible;  the  amount  of
information obtained will  depend on the relationship
developed between the recruiter and the recruit. 
Figure 2. Process of recruitment. 
In the second stage the recruiter needs to get a
positive result (i.e. the individual recruit accepts and
becomes an active member). In order to successfully
achieve this, the recruiter may entice the recruit with
various  gratifications  or  incentives  [45].  This  is
particularly true when the recruiter has control over
punishments  and rewards  because  the  more  power
the recruiter appears to have the more likely it is that
the  recruit  will  join  the  cause  [45].   In  addition,
having a relationship (preferably a close relationship)
will  help  leverage  the  cause,  unlike  approaching  a
complete  stranger.  Prisoner  radicalisation  often
operates  like  street  gangs  where  prison  gangs  are
generally  drawn  along  racial  and  ethnic  lines.
Prisoners prior to incarceration who are affiliated with
a  certain  gang  may  therefore  naturally  gravitate
towards  similar  gang  organisations  in  prison  where
members  have  each  others’  backs  [2,48].  Prison
gangs know that prisons have limited resources and
as  a  result  they  flourish  within  prisons  despite  the
best  efforts  of  corrections  officials—and  extremist
gangs are no exception [49]. 
Hamm  [7]  worked  with  the  US  Correctional
Intelligence  Initiative  (CII),  a  program  to  prevent
potential acts of terrorism by inmates in the US. The
CII  accessed  2,088  state  and  local  correctional
facilities  in  the  US  and  Hamm  [7]  found  that
radicalisation is developed on the prison gang model
and prisoner radicalisation cannot be separated from
the prison gang problem. Gang members were seen
to  be  crossing  racial  lines,  joining  forces  to  create
larger  groups  and  some  crossovers  involved
supremacists  joining  militant  Islamic  groups  [7].
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"Broadly defined, prison gangs are an  'organization'
which  operates  within  the  prison  system as  a  self
perpetuating criminally oriented entity, consisting of a
select  group  of  inmates  who  have  established  an
organized chain of command and are governed by an
established  code  of  conduct" ([50],  p.  371).  Many
prison gangs use intimidation and violence which is
usually  directed  at  outsiders  to  control  their  prison
environment [51]. 
Another study by Ungerer [48] interviewed 33 men
convicted on charges of terrorism by the Indonesian
courts  in  2010.  One  man  interviewed  (Sonhadi)
explained that terrorist convicts would band together
and form something akin to a 'shadow government' in
prison:  "They often pool  their  available resources to
ask  for  better  cells,  better  food  and  other  small
luxuries.  They'd  also run small  businesses in  prison,
from selling top-up cards for mobile phones to setting
up food stalls selling rice, cooking oil and sugar" ([48],
p. 12). There is also prestige associated with terrorist
convicts and many convicts regard them with respect
because of their willingness to lay down their lives for
religion  [48].  A  number  of  men  interviewed  also
stated that they have elevated status in society after
serving time [48]. It is not known if this is a broadly
accepted practice across all non-western prisons, but
it  was  evident  in  Ungerer's  2011  research  on  the
radicalisation of inmates within the Indonesian prison
system. 
6. Process of Radicalisation
Some researchers reject the notion that radicalisation
can be understood by a sequence of fixed stages (e.g.
Sageman [52]) while others view radicalisation as an
orderly series of stages with terrorism being the final
destination [29]. In 2007, the Intelligence Division of
the New York Police Department (NYPD) published a
study,  Radicalization  in  the  West:  The  home-grown
threat,  which  outlines  a  simplified  radicalisation
model.  In  this  report  it  identifies  that  'jihadist'
ideology  is  the  key  driver  of  radicalisation  and
suggests  four  stages  to  explain  the  process  of
radicalisation:  pre-radicalisation,  self-identification,
indoctrination and jihadisation stages  [19,29]. These
four stages are described as a 'funnel' through which
ordinary  individuals' religious  beliefs  become
progressively  more  radical  and  this  once  ordinary
individual becomes a terrorist [29]. 
The  first  stage,  pre-radicalisation,  occurs  when
individuals are placed in environments that allow them
to be receptive to extremism [2].  This can be driven
by  either  intrinsic  or  extrinsic  motivations.  Intrinsic
motivation  could  be  the  result  of  a  personal
crisis/trauma,  experiences  of  discrimination  and/or
alienation [2,53],  or  individuals  may feel  frustration
and  dissatisfaction  with  their  current  religious  faith
leading them to change their belief system [11]. On
the  other  hand,  extrinsic  motivations  could  be  any
external  factor  (e.g.  economic,  ethnic,  racial,  legal,
political,  religious,  or  social  deprivation)  that  may
negatively  affect  an  individual's  attitude  and  belief
towards those implicated; leading to a change of faith
as the answer to the perception of deprivation they
are experiencing [11]. 
The second stage, self-identification, occurs when
the individual  identifies him/herself with a particular
extremist  cause  and  essentially  changes  his/her
religious beliefs or behaviours. These individuals begin
to construct a new character based on religion and
support  for  radicalised ideologies  [11].  Also,  certain
types  of  experiences,  including  the  amount  of
exposure to Islamic radicalism (e.g. jihadist  videos),
are more likely to drive the convert from a conversion
to  jihad.  Guidance  from  supervisors  and
encouragement  to  socialise  with  other  'like-minded'
individuals reinforces their new sense of identity and
commitment [14]. Therefore, overseas travel can have
a  significant  impact  on  the  acceleration  of  the
radicalisation  process  [11].  Overall,  the  individual’s
needs  and  wants  are  increasingly  removed  and
replaced by those of the collective [14]. 
The  third  stage,  indoctrination,  furthers  this
mindset and readiness for action [14]. It occurs once
a convert has accepted the radical ideology but may
be unsure or unfamiliar with how to participate. Part
of this stage is becoming an active participant. This
involves small-group and individual participation that
allows  the  recruit  to  know  and  recognise  his/her
potential as a jihadist. What is critical in this stage is
the knowledge, skills, and leadership of senior figures.
This  is  a  highly  volatile  and  emotional  stage  for
recruits [14]. Confidence increases over time and the
individual’s  mind  becomes  saturated  with  radical
ideologies. The only solution to their problems is to
stand  up  for  what  they  believe  in  through  violent
action [11]. 
The final stage, jihadisation, is engaging directly in
terrorist  activities  (which  can  be  violent  or  non-
violent)  and  is  always  done  with  the  intention  of
inflicting damage to the enemy:  "During this stage,
role identification can be so strong as to completely
erase a sense of individualisation, thereby preventing
the possibility of the individual acting in their own self
interests  by  leaving  the  group" ([14].  p.  40).  It  is
important  to  note  that  these  stages  are  not
chronological and individuals can skip stages, reaching
more violent actions quicker [53]. It also means that
individuals may stop the process and may not be fully
radicalised;  conversely,  even  if  they  are  fully
radicalised  they  will  not  necessarily  carry  out  a
terrorist  attack  [29]:  "Commitment  is  constantly
calibrated and re-recalibrated. Some drop out along
the  way.  A  component  of  our  counter-recruiting
strategy must be to always offer a safe way back from
the edge" ([23], p. 4). 
Silber  and  Bhatt's  [29]  model  represents
radicalisation  as  key  transition  points  along  a  time
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course  beginning  with  ordinary-life  individuals  and
moving  down  a  path  where  these  individuals  have
direct involvement in terrorist activities [13]. However,
this model lacks a full understanding of psychological,
organisational, and social processes that lead people
into  radicalisation  and  their  continuation  towards
committing acts of terrorism [13]. 
7. Concluding Remarks
Radicalisation  is  a  modern  social  phenomenon  and
has displayed a substantial presence and complexity
as an emergent concept among disciplines [14]. Yet
there are still major problems surrounding the concept
of radicalisation, for instance defining the concept of
radicalisation and terrorism, collecting empirical data,
and building integrative theory [54].
There are many conclusions to be drawn from this
literature  review.  First,  in  order  for  experts  and
scholars to gain a better understanding of the concept
of  radicalisation  a  generic  definition  needs  to  be
established.  From  the  literature  provided  above,  it
seems that within the definition of radicalisation there
needs to be some reference to  'extreme movement
activity',  that  radicalisation  is  a  'process' over  time,
and that  'not all radicals' or radical thoughts lead to
terrorist  actions.  Achieving  clarity  in  defining  the
concept  of  radicalisation  and  using  appropriate
guidance  from existing  theories  (such  as  SMT)  will
help provide a platform for moving forward. 
Second, it  is important to acknowledge that each
one of  us can potentially  have opinions that others
would  consider  radical.  This  does  not  mean  that
individuals,  with  criminals  being  no  exception,  with
radical  thoughts  are  setting  themselves  up  for
committing acts of terrorism. In reality, radicals and
radical ideas can play a positive role in communities.
For example many historical figures were considered
radical,  such as Martin Luther King, Nelson Mandela
and  Gandhi.  Even  some  violent  radicals  have  been
seen to be acting in the name of the cause and that
their actions were just, such as the nineteenth century
American abolitionist, John Brown, who used violent
acts to fight slavery [55,56]. 
Third,  radicals  and  individuals  who  undergo  the
radicalisation  process  are  different  from  ordinary
criminals. Hoffman [57] points out that both terrorists
and criminals employ violence to attain specific goals;
however,  terrorists  are  motivated  by  ideological,
religious,  or  political  gain,  whereas  criminals  are
largely  driven  by  material  gain.  Hoffman  [57]  also
suggests that terrorists believe they are fighting for a
cause. Finally, terrorists seek to impact and influence
a  wider  audience,  while  criminals  do  not  generally
seek to disseminate terror to the general public [58].
Individuals who contemplate committing terrorist acts
(such as killing citizens) do so because they believe
that these actions are feasible and just [37]. However,
not  all  radicalisation is  negative nor  does it  lead to
violence.  For  example,  radical  Islamic  Puritanism
involves  seeking  greater  religious  purity  (e.g.  the
individual  returns  to  a  'pure  Islam')  and separating
themselves  from  the  influences  of  Western  society
[18]. However, when making a distinctive difference
between  individuals  who  accept  radical  ideas  and
individuals  who  actively  participate  in  violent
behaviour,  there  can  be  some  blurring  between
individuals since not all individuals who radicalise end
up participating in violent behaviour [37]. 
Fourth,  a  prisoner's  vulnerability  to  radicalisation
does  not  end  after  release  from  prison.  Many
individuals who leave prison lack basic support (e.g.
financial,  emotional,  or  familial  support)  and where
support does exit, it is often provided by community
and religious groups. This gives extremist groups the
opportunity  to  disguise  the  organisation  as  a
legitimate  support  group  where  ties  with  former
prisoners can be maintained. One extremist group, al-
Haramain,  maintained  a  database  containing
information (including names, release dates and the
addresses to which the individuals would be released)
on  over  15,000  prisoners  who  were  classified  as
vulnerable to the group’s message [58,59]. 
Fifth,  it  is  important to acknowledge the ongoing
debate that surrounds two questions: 1) Where is the
most appropriate place to contain terrorists? and 2)
What  is  the  most  effective  way  of  doing  so?  [12].
Researchers  have  suggested  two possible  strategies
for incarcerating prisoners: isolation or concentration.
The isolation method separates terrorists  from each
other [5]. Neumann [5] indicated that this is the most
effective  way  to  deter  terrorists  from  ideologies
because  their  communication  is  hindered  and
interaction with other terrorists has stopped. It  also
makes it very difficult for terrorists to organise future
attacks  because  of  the  high  level  of  security.  The
second method is  concentration,  where all  terrorists
are  imprisoned  in  the  one  facility  and  specialised
resources (e.g. staff in the field of linguistics or de-
radicalisation training teams) are employed [12]. From
a resource perspective concentration is beneficial  as
high  security  resources  are  only  needed  in  a  few
locations  [12].  However,  it  can  have  problematic
consequences.  For  example,  many  jihad  extremist
groups are made up of small,  loosely affiliated cells
and  teams.  It  is  therefore  possible  that  if  such
individuals  are  concentrated  their  loose  networks
could consolidate into a more cohesive and organised
form [12]. Overall, academics in the field of terrorism
(see  [2,5,7,10])  agree  that  we  may  be  facilitating
radicalism by integrating converted Islamic extremists
with criminals.
Finally, even though radicalisation does not always
result in violence, it is important to establish effective
methods  to  minimise  'the  minority' of  radicals  who
have  the  potential  to  become  violence.  Some  may
argue that only a small percentage of radicals actually
partake in extreme violence. However, it is important
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to remember  that  the goal  is  to minimise violence,
regardless  of  how big or  small  the  potential  threat
may appear to be.
Scholars  have  suggested  that  the  root  cause  of
prison  radicalisation  is  related  to  overcrowding  of
maximum  security  prisons,  with  few  rehabilitative
programmes, and a shortage of chaplains to provide
religious guidance [7]. These root causes should be
explored  in  conjunction  with  topics  such  as  inmate
subculture,  extremist  interpretations  of  religious
doctrines and how they lead to hatred and violence,
and the vulnerability of inmates to radicalism. Future
studies  should  also  recognise  and  take  into
consideration  that  radicalisation  is  a  process  that
occurs  over  time  and  that  these  stages  are  not
sequential and the speed in which an individual goes
through these stages can vary significantly depending
on  individual  circumstances.  Ultimately,  this
phenomenon needs to be explored more fully so we
can enhance our understanding and provide effective
solutions to minimise radicalisation in prisons [1,12]. 
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